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Pedro Marangoni (Portugues, English)

Attention! To download Pedro Marangoni's book "Opcao pela Espada", click on the PDF file icon at the top of the Russian version of this page: /main/other_side/p_marangoni_rus

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Pedro Marangoni:  Quatro MLRS BM-21 Grad deteram os inimigos que avancavam sobre Luanda e mudaram o rumo da guerra?

Sim, mas como arma de efeito moral e nao destrutivo.

Pedro Marangoni  /upload/1265466298_super_image.jpg nasceu em Sao Paulo , Brasil  em 1949. Foi formado no Centro de Formacao de Pilotos Militares da Forca Aerea Brasileira (1968-1971). Ocupacao - Piloto de Helicopteros, 9.000 horas de voo. Serviu na Legiao Estrangeira  Francesa (1972-1973). Depois viveu em Mocambique (1973-1974). Chegou para Angola em Junho 1975, combateu com o grupo do coronel Santos e Castro ao lado da FNLA.   Participou na Batalha de Quifangondo (23 de Outubro - 10 de Novembro de 1975). Abandonou a luta em Fevereiro de 1976.  Viveu na  Rhodesia (1976 – 1977). Depois esteve com a Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana, na regiao de fronteira com a Rhodesia, Inyanga, Umtali. Em 1979-1980 serviu na Legiao Espanhola. Depois de Africa voltou para o Brasil e trabalhou na Amazonia (Brasil), Bolivia e Peru, como piloto de helicopteros por cerca de 20 anos. Agora vive no Brasil.

Livros publicados: “Angola-Comandos especiais contra cubanos” . “A opcao pela espada” (Brasil, 2 edicoes). “Maria da Silva e a era do nao” (Brasil). “A grande manada/o infinito nao tem pressa” (Brasil). 

Observando o comportamento dos africanos em combate, de um modo nao cientifico mas baseados em guerras recentes, verificaremos que a sua combatividade decresce do norte para o sul do continente negro. Minha experiencia na Africa Austral mostrava que quem atacava vencia, quem era atacado recuava sempre e a maior parte das vitimas eram civis, nao militares. Frentes elasticas e combatentes sem qualquer motivacao mais profunda. Era a proporcao de nao-africanos – advisers, internacionalistas, mercenarios, voluntarios, etc., que decidia os confrontos. Estes eram tropas de conquista, os outros, de simples ocupacao de terreno conquistado. E assim aconteceu tambem em Angola, de forma significativa.

Os combatentes nao-africanos com ideais ou vontade de vencer eram afetados por armas que realmente eram perigosas e produziam baixas; a esmagadora maioria africana temia qualquer coisa que explodia e fizesse barulho. Desculpem-me por nao ser politicamente correto, mas esta e a verdade.

Fui, nos anos setenta, advertido de que estaria fornecendo informacoes importantes ao inimigo, ao menosprezar em artigos escritos, o 122 sovietico, que considerava uma arma de efeito moral, nao efetivo para causar baixas. Mas assim o via, como os demais colegas de combate. Temiamos mais um morteiro 81. Um morteiro 120, entao, nos pregava ao solo, irremediavelmente...
Observei incontaveis vezes, a marca deixada no asfalto ou no solo, por explosoes do 122 e dos morteiros 120, 81, 60. Os estilhacos dos morteiros rasgavam o solo no ponto de impacto, desenhando uma estrela, mostrando que varreram o solo em trajetoria rasante, atingindo mesmo quem estivesse deitado. Ja o 122 deixava poucas marcas, com estilhacos sendo lancados em angulo mais fechado, mais alto e menos perigosos. Varios cairam a poucos metros de mim na batalha de Quifangondo, sem maiores danos. Tenho certeza que qualquer morteiro caindo na mesma curta distancia teria me posto fora de combate.

Mas a capacidade de lancamento multiplo, apido, sequencial dos MLRS BM-21 e devastador para tropas mal treinadas, inexperientes ou pouco motivadas. Sem nenhuma duvida eles foram decisivos para o panico e a debandada geral das tropas da FNLA e zairenses em Quifangondo.
E o que deteve a pequena tropa nao-africana? Em primeiro lugar, os canhoes anti-carro 76 mm, que aproveitaram o absurdo avanco das frageis Panhard totalmente descobertas; em segundo lugar, para segurar os poucos infantes que seguiriam atras delas, as metralhadoras anti-aereas (ZPU-4?) cujo tiro podiamos sentir sobre nossas cabecas e que nao nos deixavam levantar do solo.

Mas, mesmo se as Panhards nao fossem detidas e nosso pequeno grupo pudesse avancar, nao teriamos ninguem nos seguindo, pois o grosso da tropa africana debandara apavorada pelo efeito psicologicamente devastador dos MLRS BM-21 Grad...

Resumindo, sim, concordo que esta arma foi decisiva nao so no rumo da batalha, mas de toda a guerra. Acredito que se o indisciplinado exercito zairense entrasse em Luanda, tudo seria arrasado e saqueado e uma avalanche de tropas de Mobutu Sesse Seko se despejariam pela fronteira norte, numa ocupacao criminosa. E nos, o pequeno grupo de comandos especiais que por um ideal, serviu de ponta de lanca, seriamos dizimados ou presos ou expulsos, pois representavamos um obstaculo as barbaries zairenses em solo angolano.


Pedro Marangoni: «A bem da historia militar sera um mapa incomum, feito em conjunto pelos dois lados opostos envolvidos»

 

 Entrevista

do ex-combatente da Batalha do Quifangondo ao lado da FNLA Pedro Marangoni, cedida ao Secretario da imprensa da Uniao Russa dos Veteranos de Angola

Serguei Kolomnin

 

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

Estimado Pedro Marangoni!

Fico-lhe muito grato por suas mensagens relativas a Batalha de Quifangondo, em particular pelo artigo "Quatro MLRS BM-21 Grad deteram os inimigos que avancavam sobre Luanda e mudaram o rumo da guerra?", que ja foi publicado no nosso website em russo e portugues.

Encontrei nas suas mensagens alguns elementos muito interessantes para mim, como historico, em particular, em relacao ao efeito provocado pelas metralhadoras anti-aereas ZPU-4 de calibre 14,5 mm (os angolanos e cubanos os chamavam "cuatro bocas"), ao efeito moral, produzido por salvas de BM-21 e tambem acerca do numero exacto de comandos especiais portugueses ao lado da FNLA e ELP (Exercito de Libertacao Portugues). E mais algumas perguntas, se permitir.

 

- O ELP – foi simplesmente o slogan, ou forca real com a estructura, programa e o comando formados?  

 

Pedro Marangoni:

 

- Como recebi sua mensagem em portugues correto, vejo que nao e atraves de tradutor eletronico e sim de quem tem otimos conhecimentos da lingua portuguesa, portanto ficarei mais a vontade para responder em meu idioma.

O ELP so seria mencionado de forma politica, tentando comprometer a FNLA e tambem porque dizia-se que o Coronel Santos e Castro  /upload/1265215912_super_image.jpg era ligado a este "exercito" que considero apenas teorico, nunca chegou a existir como forca real, coesa, organizada e pronta para combate. Apenas uma organizacao politica. Nunca ajudou nossas tropas, que foram recrutadas entre portugueses refugiados na Rhodesia, pelo comandante das Flechas, Alves Cardoso, da DGS/PIDE. Mas os membros do grupo do Coronel Santos e Castro nao eram mercenarios, eram combatentes, que viviam em Africa e quiseram ficar la para passar ali a sua vida. Era composto por 153 portugueses mais eu. O unico militar do grupo que poderia se chamar de “estrangeiro" era eu, brasileiro, mas com dupla nacionalidade portuguesa. O Coronel Santos e Castro apareceria em Ambriz, como adviser militar de Holden Roberto e ligacao com o nosso grupo. Depois passara a participar dos combates, fardado mas sem armas. Depois de Quifangondo volta a Europa.

 

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

 - O que pode dizer da ajuda dos EUA a FNLA e ao ELP?

 

Pedro Marangoni:

 - Quanto  a ajuda dos EUA, tinhamos pouco apoio e se os EUA ajudavam mais, provavelmente a ajuda era desviada por Mobutu. Muitos artigos tambem exageram a atuacao dos norte-americanos, que pouco interviram e pouco nos ajudaram. Muitos livros historicos agora apenas mais uma obra politica, repleta de mentiras e exageros; estes livros prestam-se para falsear a historia da descolonizacao e dificultar para que as geracoes pos guerra conhecam o que se passou realmente e aprendam a nao repetir erros do passado.

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

- Na edicao "FAPLA baluarte da paz em"  (Berger-Levrault International, Paris. Р. 110) le-se, que a ponte sobre rio Bengo tinha sido  destruida pelos sapadores das FAPLA para impedir o avanco da tropa da FNLA. Alguns angolanos participantes na Batalha de Quifangondo (FAPLA) mencionam a de Panguila tambem como destruida. O General Xavier, actual responsavel da Academia Militar das Forcas Armadas Angolanas  (http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/20/0/general_xavier_historia_vivida_em_kifangondo) tambem insiste no facto a ponte sobre rio Bengo tinha sido destruida.

Outro ex-combatente (FAPLA) Alvaro Antonio, que e o capitao, actualmente colocado na Unidade da Guarda presidencial (UGP) (http://allafrica.com/stories/200811120632.html) na entrevista a TV angolana afirma: "Nesta altura em que se destruiu a ponte estavam a atravessar tres viaturas, entre as quais um tanque que ainda nao tinha passado, tendo as outras duas caido com a ponte, morrendo os seus ocupantes". Ele acrescentou ainda, "que desta accao resultou a captura de quatro mercenarios norte-mericanos que permaneceram encarcerados na ex-sala do director da Escola Primária da Fazenda experimental da Funda".

Se a ponte do Bengo estava destruida, de que maneira a tropa da FNLA tencionara e conseguiria atravessar o rio? A nado?

Ou a ponte sobre rio Bengo continuava a funcionar, tendo so alguns danos nao significativos? Conforme a minha experiencia militar explodir e destruir a ponte solida, construida em betao e uma coisa nao facil…

 

Pedro Marangoni:

- Encontrei as recordacoes do General angolano Xavier honestas, parece-me ele realmente esteve em Quifangondo. Mas nenhuma das duas pontes estavam destruidas e nao entendo porque os angolanos insistem em mentir sobre um facto que daria ate mais valor a luta deles... Claro com a ponte destruida, seria uma defesa mais segura, praticamente admitindo que nao conseguiriam deter o inimigo. A ponte destruida seria uma protecao a mais.

Talvez a  ponte do Bengo estivesse SABOTADA, NAO DESTRUIDA, OU SEJA, COLOCARAM AS CARGAS EXPLOSIVAS E NAO DETONARAM, TAL SERIA FEITO APENAS SE NAO CONSEGUISSEM NOS DETER! Sera que isso aconteceu tambem na ponte do Panguila, onde encontramos os cordoes detonantes? E a explosao teria falhado?

Um grupo de comandos com o capitao Valdemar precedeu o grande ataque, infiltrando-se pela madrugada e tomando a primeira ponte, do Panguila. Apenas cordoes detonantes foram encontrados, sem explosivos. Eu proprio passei por ela, intacta. A segunda ponte tambem, no primeiro ataque foi avistada inteira pelos blindados e tambem pelos avioes de reconhecimento.

Se a ponte do Bengo estava destruida, como posteriormente as Faplas/cubanos avancaram contra o Morro da Cal e Caxito? Pelas pontes...A preocupacao da FNLA era que, as duas pontes fossem destruidas quando avancassemos e a engenharia zairense so tinha uma ponte disponivel para construir.

Ainda sobre pontes: a unica ponte importante que foi destruida pelo MPLA, quando do grande avanco da FNLA rumo a Luanda foi a de Porto Quipiri, na saida de Caxito. Ai a engenharia zairense construiu uma flutuante, de madeira e depois uma grande ponte metalica, que permanece ate hoje.

Depoimento do capitao Alvaro Antonio... lembremos sempre: a primeira vitima da guerra e a verdade... Atualmente existem mais herois que combatentes na ocasiao da batalha... estaria ele la? Lembremos que os cubanos, de arma na mao tiveram que obrigar os angolanos a voltarem para os postos de combate, pois fugiam em panico. Nao existiram, por exemplo, quatro mercenarios norte-americanos capturados! No combate, foram capturados apenas o municiador da Panhard-90 Remedios, o condutor da Panhard-60 Serra e seu atirador Oliveira, todos portugueses. Americano so havia um, observador do CIA, sempre desarmado, que nao saiu do Morro da Cal. Os autenticos mercenarios apareceram no Norte de Angola um mes depois de Quifangondo, eram na verdade os Ingleses e Americanos, mas nao conseguiram nada, pois a luta ja tinha terminado.

O meu grande amigo Remedios foi capturado porque foi ferido com gravidade (esta vivo e hoje mora em ), mas Serra e Oliveira suspeita-se que forcaram a queda da Panhard-60 no pantano para se entregar, desertando. Talvez voce tenha conhecido Oliveira, fiquei surpreso ao ve-lo na televisao, anos mais tarde como comandante militar das FAPLA num setor no Sul de Angola!

Um facto interessante e que nem mesmo o MPLA nos considerava realmente mercenarios, apenas usavam como propaganda, pois meus colegas capturados nao foram julgados com os ingleses e americanos e tiveram tratamento mais humano. Alem de Remedios, Serra e Oliveira, capturados em Quifangondo, anteriormente haviam sido capturados na batalha de Caxito em 7 de Setembro de 1975 os comandos especiais brancos: Quintino, Fernandes e Pereira. Eles estao na foto do seu  arquivo:/upload/1264179068_super_image.jpg  

Resumindo, no Quifangondo ficaram no terreno uma Panhard-90, uma Panhard-60 e um caminhao Mercedes zairense; brancos capturados – 3, todos portugueses. O tal capitao mente.

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

- Qual foi o destino da maioria dos comandos portugueses apos o desastre do Quifangondo?  Portugal ? Africa do Sul?

 

Pedro Marangoni:

- Como ja disse o coronel Santos e Castro voltou a Europa. Outros foram-se embora depois que abandonamos a luta em Fevereiro de 1976, alguns continuaram a luta. Por exemplo, o meu  colega a quem chamavamos "Passarao" (esta de pe, na extrema direita na foto /upload/1265473138_super_image.jpg). Tomei conhecimento que ele retornou do Zaire e continuou combatendo sozinho (ele havia nascido la, era um africano branco a quem negavam a patria), fazendo emboscadas contra os cubanos, formou e comandou um pequeno grupo, atuando na regiao de Ambriz, ate que em Outubro de 1977, sofreu queimaduras graves com o mosquiteiro que pegou fogo e agonizou por duas semanas ate morrer. Foi enterrado pelos africanos na mata perto da Fazenda Loge, regiao de Ambriz.

Apos Angola os comandos portugueses voltaram para a Rhodesia, alguns para o Brasil, buscando uma patria nova e outros para Portugal, pais que alguns nunca haviam estado, africanos brancos de varias geracoes e que foram muito discriminados pelos portugueses na Europa.

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

- E de conhecimeto geral, que atacando contra Quifangondo a FNLA e  os zairenses foram apoiaos pela artilharia de longo alcance  sul-africana.  O que poderia dizer a este respeito?

 

Pedro Marangoni:

- As pecas   140-mm G-2 sul-africanas chegaram ao Morro a Cal na tarde do dia 9 e comecaram o fogo de barragem no dia 10 por volta das 05:00H;  foram diminuindo a intensidade do fogo ate cessar de vez, nao sei precisar o momento. Segundo o сoronel Santos e Castro, que me informou pessoalmente, as 16:30H (04:30 PM) os sul-africanos se retiraram do local com todo o material, sem autorizacao ou comunicar a ninguem. Os sul-africanos fugiram durante o combate. Apos Caxito abandonaram os obuses sem as culatras e foram resgatados em Ambriz, já noite, por um helicoptero. Fugiram de helicoptero para um barco na costa de Ambriz, levando as culatras dos obuses 140-mm G-2. Tudo a revelia da FNLA. Os obuses posteriormente foram rebocados pela FNLA, mas sem poder usa-los, acabaram em Ambrizete como ferro velho.

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

- Poderia pormenorizar o despositivo de combate e a composicao da forca da FNLA e zairenses? Quantos carros Panhard, soldados (FNLA e zairenses), pecas de artilharia haviam no palco de combate no dia 10 de Novembro perante o ultimo ataque contra Quifangondo?

 

Pedro Marangoni:

 - Numeros aproximados.

Artilharia:  1 canhao 130-mm, Africa do Sul 3 obuses 140-mm, FNLA alguns morteiros 120-mm.

Cavalaria: Comandos Especiais: 1 Panhard-90 (destruida), 2 Panhards-60 (uma destruida e uma avariada), 1 VTT Panhard com um grupo de combate, retornou ileso sem lancar a tropa, um jeep com canhao 106-mm sem recuo (nao participou).

Zaire: cerca de 10 jeeps com canhao 106-mm sem recuo (nao participaram), umas 15 Panhards diversas, nenhuma participou do combate, assim que transpuseram a ponte do Panguila descarregaram toda a municao e recuaram. Varios canhoes antiaereos 20-mm montados em jeeps (nao participaram).

Infantaria: Comandos, dos 154, cerca de 80 participaram do combate, apenas uns 10 cruzaram a ponte do Panguila avancando, o restante nao avancou, permaneceu antes da ponte.   

FNLA: cerca de 800 homens (nao tenho certeza, numero aproximado), nenhum cruzou a ponte do Panguila.

Zaire: um batalhao de infantaria (dizem dois, nao sei), uma equipe de engenharia; dois caminhoes Mercedes, carregados de soldados zairenses cruzaram a ponte do Panguila e comecaram a morrer sem chance de defesa na primeira curva depois da ponte. Poucos voltaram, quase todos feridos. Um dos caminhoes retornou a noite, apos o combate, com alguns homens.

Quando recuei para o Morro da Cal, debaixo de cerrado bombardeio, por volta das 18:00H (06:00PM) do dia 10, tudo estava completamente deserto e as unicas viaturas eram o jeep do staff e a nossa VTT Panhard.

Na noite de 11 de Novembro 1975, apos a derrota, juntamente com o Coronel Santos e Castro,  apenas 26 homens ficaram na frente de combate no Morro da Cal, todos comandos especiais, portugueses, entre eles todos os oficiais. Nenhum dos quadros da FNLA.  A FNLA simplesmente fugiu  mato adentro sem comando e os zairenses recuaram para o Caxito.

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

- A maioria das fontes (livros, recordacoes) mencionam os tres avioes da FA sul-africana  "Buccanir" a bombardear as posicoes FAPLA/cubanos na manha do dia 10 de Novembro.

De outro lado,  o General Xavier (Jornal de Angola, 13 de Janeiro 2010. General Xavier: História vivida em Kifangondo) diz o seguinte: "as FAPLA estavam a espera de uma investida maior no dia 10 de Novembro de 1975. O relogio indicava 05H00, quando dois avioes se fizeram aos ceus flagelando as posicoes das FAPLA, no Morro de Kifangondo. A primeira impressao e que fomos bombardeados pela aviacao, mas nao. Eram voos de reconhecimento que iam verificar os acessos, principalmente o estado das pontes…" E acrescenta: "eram avionetas de reconhecimento, que partiam da pista do Ambriz ou de pequenas pistas em fazendas como a Martins de Almeida".

Como poderia comentar estas palavras do veterano? Eram bombardeiros da Africa do Sul ou avionetas de reconhecimento FNLA? Se havia realmente aviacao sul-africana envolvida nessa batalha?

 

Pedro Marangoni:

- Avioes? Isto e muito interessante, confirmo as palavras do General Xavier, eram apenas dois avioes nossos, convencionais, civis, de observacao, decolados de Ambriz, mas ja era dia claro. Os primeiros tiros dos 140 sul-africanos foram em Luanda e depois foram recuando o alcance para atingir Quifangondo, coincidindo com a passagem dos avioes,o que para leigos poderia ser tomado por um bombardeio aereo.

Misterio: realmente por volta das 05:00H ouvi um ruido semelhante a jactos de combate em grande altitude e depois tres explosoes surdas, nao mais, abafadas entre o morro de Quifangondo e Luanda . Avioes ou uma experiencia de tiro com canhoes de uma fragata sul- africana que estava ao largo, com alcance suficiente para atingir o local? Isto e apenas uma conjectura minha, sem informacoes. Nem o coronel Santos e Castro ou o major Alves Cardoso foram comunicados de ajuda de avioes ou marinha sul-africana. Se houve uma tentativa, nao foi alem, talvez devido a dificuldade de execucao (proximidade das forcas oponentes no terreno).

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

- No seu livro "А Opcao Pela Espada" ha um mapa bastante pormenorizada e bem clara /upload/1264786543_super_image.jpg das posicoes FNLA/zairenses - FAPLA/cubanos no Quifangondo. Mesmo com o numero exato das pecas e obuses (1 canhao 130-mm zairence, 3 obuses 140-mm sul-africanos, FNLA etc.) Voce indicou os quatro BM-21 nas posicoes FAPLA/cubanos por acaso ou tinha informacao mais ou menos exata? Muitas fontes dizem, que eram seis.

Conforme minha opiniao baseada nas certas recordacoes, eram quatro BM-21, que chegaram ao Quifangondo nas vesperas do dia 10 de Novembro. Como poderia comentar isso?

O que podera dizer a respeito do mapa da batalha feita do ponto de vista dos angolanos, que   exposta no nosso site /upload/1265475698_super_image.jpg?

 

Pedro Marangoni:

- O mapa de Quifangondo exposta ali /upload/1265475698_super_image.jpg  e um documento valioso. E aparentemente as posicoes das Faplas/cubanos estao proximas daquilo que imaginei. Existe, no indice, um simbolo para ponte destruida para impedir o avanco inimigo! Novamente a insistencia das pontes destruidas e note-se que estranhamente  nao se acha no terreno tal simbolo, apenas no indice. As mencoes de mercenarios referem-se ao nosso grupo, pois os mercenarios de Callan so chegariam em mais tarde. Nossas posicoes e rota de ataque e posterior retirada estao corretas, apenas nao existem datas.  Nota-se que, colocam correctamente o nosso grupo na vanguarda e a FNLA na nossa retaguarda. Com excessao do simbolo ponte destruida e do suposto bombardeamento da aviacao, me parece um mapa honesto.

 

O meu mapa /upload/1264786543_super_image.jpg foi feito de memoria, sem escala e sem consulta a um mapa real do terreno; e apenas o que visualisei no decorrer do combate. O lado da FNLA/Zaire/Comandos e exato; do lado inimgo sao minhas conjecturas. O numero e localizacao de canhoes anti carro por informacao do tenente Paes na primeira investida.

O numero de BM-21 calculei pela sequencia de lancamento, quando cairam em maior intensidade, pela concentracao das explosoes; apenas uma hipotese que agora me parece acertada.

Observacao: em meu livro, "Orgaos de Stalin", juntamente com monocaxito era a terminologia generica que davamos a qualquer missil 122, de lancador simples ou nao, sem significar BM-21./main/nauka/Qifangondo#_edn64

Se voce tiver dados confiaveis, autorizo que atualize com mais precisao a metade das fapla-cubanos no mapa.

 

Serguei Kolomnin:

Se poderia fazer uns comentarios acerca das fotos expostas na  nossa pagina, dedicada a este tema /main/nauka/fotokifangondo?

As fotos №№9 e 11 com Panhards destruidas sao originais de Angola dos tempos . Talvez saiba quem esta junto com Holden Roberto na foto №3? Foto №4  - sao soldados da FNLA ou zairenses? 

 

Pedro Marangoni:

Foto №3. /upload/1264175592_super_image.jpg Em primeiro plano nao sei identificar; atras, ao lado de Holden, e o jornalista brasileiro e assessor do Presidente, Fernando Luis da Camara Cascudo.

 Foto №4. /upload/1264175329_super_image.jpg  Esta foto me parece ser dos tempos mais fortes da FNLA, antes da guerra civil e mesmo do 25 de Аbril de 1974 e foi feita no Zaire, provavelmente na base de Quinkuzo. Nunca mais se viu tal concentracao de tropas.

 Foto №№ 9 e 11  /upload/1264178472_super_image.jpg      /upload/1264254311_super_image.jpg

Nao da para identificar; mas em toda a guerra civil os comandos perderam apenas uma Panhard-90, a do tenente Paes em Quifangondo.

Foto №12 /upload/1264179068_super_image.jpg  Como ja disse sao os primeiros comandos especiais capturados na batalha de Caxito em 7 de Setembro de 1975, onde participaram de improviso e com armamento obsoleto, sendo envolvidos devido a enorme inferioridade numerica; bateram-se bem. Da esquerda para a direita, (brancos) Quintino, pelotao G-3; Fernandes, paraquedista, pelotao MAG; Pereira , motorista caminhao Mercedez.

Encontrei mais fotos que tem mais relacao com Quifangondo, fotos nunca publicadas, em mal estado, mas importantes e autorizo a publicacao no site. Foram me dadas pelo autor, Azevedo, tripulante, que escapou da Panhard-60 cujos dois tripulantes foram capturados em Quifangondo.

 Mostram a chegada da artilharia sul-africana no Morro da Cal. Ao lado, uma torre de madeira, marco geodesico que marcava nossa posicao ao inimigo e que ninguem se preocupou em derrubar /upload/1265225452_super_image.jpg  e tambem as nossas tres Panhards, estacionadas no abrigo onde passamos a noite antes do combate. /upload/1265477608_super_image.jpg

Outra foto mostra a Panhard-90 do tenente Paes, pronta para descer ao Panguila, com a flamula onde se lia «Ouso»! /upload/1265225116_super_image.jpg As fotos coloridas mostram no jeep, apos a conquista de Quicabo, o comando Remedios, que foi capturado em Quifangondo, com sua M-79, que o General Xavier relata estar no museu em Luanda /upload/1265217091_super_image.jpg .

A outra e da “Forca Aerea da FNLA”, logo apos meu bombardeio, junto com Rabelo, um piloto civil, contra a emissora oficial em Luanda . Os homens com tarja preta sao os tecnicos em explosivos, uma equipe de muito valor, que prepararam as cargas que lancei. /upload/1265478619_super_image.jpg

Como conclusao queria dizer o seguinte: publicando estas fotos e meus depoimentos Veteranangola.ru assim amplia a contribuicao nao so para a reconstrucao da verdadeira historia militar de Angola, bem como para alertar sobre injusticas de cunho social, discriminatorio, por parte de europeus e africanos e que devem ser conhecidas pelo menos como uma homenagem e retratacao as vitimas.

A bem da historia militar sera um mapa incomum, feito em conjunto pelos dois lados opostos envolvidos. Creio que e uma oportunidade de mostrar ao mundo que militares em confronto sao profissionais em trabalho, nao inimigos pessoais.

 FIM

 


 English version

 

Pedro Marangoni: Four MRLS BM-21 Grad stopped the enemy advancing on Luanda and changed the course of the war?
 
Yes, but as a weapon of morale, not destructive power. 
 

Pedro Marangoni /upload/1265466298_super_image.jpg was born in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1949. It was trained at the Center for Military Pilot Training of the Brazilian Air Force (1968-1971). He was an helicopter Pilot with 9,000 hours of flight. He served in the French Foreign Legion (1972-1973). Once lived in Mozambique (1973-1974). He arrived [in Angola] in June 1975, fought with the group of Colonel Santos e Castro on the side of the FNLA. Participated in the Battle of Quifangondo (October 23 - November 10, 1975). He abandoned the fight in February 1976. He lived in Rhodesia  (1976 - 1977). Afterwards he was with the Mozambican National Resistance in the region bordering  Rhodesia, Inyanga, Umtali.  In 1979-1980 he served in the Spanish Legion. After Africa he returned to Brazil and worked in Amazonia (Brazil), Bolivia and Peru, as a helicopter pilot for about 20 years. Now he lives in Brazil.
 Books published: "Angola-Special commands against Cubans". "The option by the sword" (Brazil, 2 editions). "Maria da Silva and the era of not" (Brazil). "The big herd / infinity is not in a hurry" (Brazil). 


 
Observing the behavior of Africans in combat, not in a scientific way but based on recent wars, we find that its toughness decreases from north to south of the continent. My experience in southern Africa showed that those who attacked won while the one being attacked always retreated and most of the victims were civilians, not soldiers. Elastic Fronts and combatants without any deeper motivation. It was the non-Africans - advisers, internationalists, mercenaries, volunteers, etc.., who decided the clashes. These were troops of conquest while the other were tasked with the basic occupation of conquered land. That also happened significantly in Angola. 
 
The non-Africans combatants, with ideals or will to win, were affected by weapons that were really dangerous and produced casualties; the overwhelming majority of Africans, on the other hand, feared anything that exploded and made noise. Sorry for not being politically correct, but this is the truth. 
 
In the seventies I was warned that I would be providing the enemy with important information by depreciating, in my written articles, the Soviet 122mm, which I considered a stun gun, not effective enough to cause casualties. But that's how I saw it, along with my other fellow fighters. We were much more afraid of the 81mm mortar. And a 120mm mortar would simply "glue us" to the ground ... 
I saw countless times the marks left on the pavement or soil caused by explosions of 122 and the 120, 81 and 60mm mortars. Mortar shrapnel tore the ground at the point of impact, drawing a star, showing that they had swept the ground in grazing trajectory, reaching even those who were lying. The 122mm, on the other hand, left little marks, with shrapnel being thrown at a closed angle, being thus louder but less dangerous. Several of these shells fell a few feet from me in the battle of Quifangondo without causing any damage. I'm sure that any mortar falling into the same short distance would have put me out of combat. 


 
But the ability of the BM-21 MLRS to deliver multiple projectiles at a fast rate of fire was devastating to  poorly trained, inexperienced or poorly motivated troops. Undoubtly they were decisive for the panic and stampede of the FNLA and Zairian troops in Quifangondo. 
And what held the small non-African troops? First of all, the 76 mm anti-tank guns, who took advantage of the absurd advance, without any cover, of the fragile Panhard, and secondly, in order to stop the few infants who followed behind the armored cars, the anti-aircraft machine guns (ZPU-4?) whose shot we could feel over our heads and didn?t allow us to lift our heads off the ground. 
 
But even if the Panhards weren?t stopped and our small group could move forward, we would have no one following us because the bulk of the African troops had fled, terrified by the devastating psychological effect of MLRS BM-21 Grad ...

 In short, yes, I agree that this weapon was not only decisive in the course of battle, but of the entire war. I believe that if the undisciplined Zairian army had entered Luanda, everything would be destroyed and looted and an avalanche of Mobutu Sesse Seko?s troops would have cross the northern Angolan  border in a frenzy of crime. And we, the small group of special commandos fighting for an ideal, who served as the spearhead, we would be wiped out, imprisoned or expelled as we acted as an obstacle to Zairian barbarism in Angola.
 
 


 

 
Pedro Marangoni: "On behalf of the Military History, this will be an exquisite map, drawn by the two opposing sides in the conflict." 
 
 
Interview 
 
with the veteran of the Battle of Quifangondo, fighting alongside with the FNLA, Pedro Marangoni, translated into Russian by  the Press Secretary of the Union of Russian Veterans of Angola, Serguei Kolomnin.

 

 Serguei Kolomnin:
 
Dear Pedro Marangoni!
 
I am very grateful for your messages on the Battle of Quifangondo, particularly the article "Four MLRS BM-21 Grad stopped the enemy advancing on Luanda and turned the tide of war?" Which has already been published on our website in Russian and Portuguese.
 
I have found in your messages some very interesting facts (for me, as and historian), in particular the ones regarding the effects caused by ZPU-4 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns (both Angolans and Cubans called them "cuatro bocas"), the moral effects produced by the bursts of BM-21 and also the facts about the exact number of special commandos on  the side of FNLA and ELP (Portuguese Army of Liberation). And a few more questions, if you allow. 
 
- The ELP- was it a simply a slogan, or was it a real force, with a real program and command structure?
 

 Pedro Marangoni: 
 
- Since I got your message in good Portuguese, I see that you didn? t used any of those electronic translations but you have great knowledge of the Portuguese language. Therefore I'll be more comfortable to answer you in my own language.
 
The ELP was to be mentioned in a political stance only, in an attempt to compromise the FNLA and also because it was said that Colonel Santos e Castro upload/1265215912_super_image.jpg was connected to this "army" which I  consider to have been only theoretical since it never came into existence as a real force, cohesive, organized and ready for combat. It was only a political organization. It never helped our troops, who were recruited among the Portuguese refugees by Alves Cardoso, the DGS / PIDE commander of the Flechas [a Portuguese version of the Algerian ?arkis?, fighting for the French]. But the members of the group of Colonel Santos e Castro were no mercenaries, they were fighters, who lived in Africa and wanted to spend their lives over there. It consisted of 153 Portuguese plus me. I was the only one in that group that could be called a "foreigner" because I was a Brazilian, but I had dual Brazilian-Portuguese nationality. Colonel Santos e Castro appeared in Ambriz as a military adviser to Holden Roberto and liaison officer to our group. Then took part in the fighting, wearing a uniform but without weapons. After Quifangondo he went back to Europe.
 
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
- What can be said of U.S. aid to the FNLA and ELP?


 Pedro Marangoni: 
 
As for U.S. aid, we had little support and if the U.S. ever gave an extra help, it is surely likely that help was diverted by Mobutu. Many [newspaper] articles also exaggerate the American actions since they seldom intervened and gave us little help. Many historical books are just political work, full of lies and exaggerations. These books lend themselves to distort the history of decolonization and make difficult for the post-war generations to know what really happened and to learn how to not repeat past mistakes. 
 
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
- When editing "FAPLA bulwark of peace. (Berger-Levrault International, Paris, 1989. Р. 110) is read, the bridge over the river Bengo had been destroyed by FAPLA sappers to prevent the advance of the FNLA troops. Some Angolan participants in the Battle of Quifangondo (FAPLA) mention how Panguila was also destroyed. General Xavier, current head of the Military Academy of the Angolan Armed Forces (
http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/20/0/general_xavier_historia_vivida_em_kifangondo) also stresses the fact that the bridge over the river Bengo had been destroyed.

Another ex-combatant (FAPLA) Alvaro Antonio, a captain currently placed in the Presidential Guard Unit (UGP) (
http://allafrica.com/stories/200811120632.html) in a interview to the Angolan TV, said: " In the exact moment we destroyed the bridge, three cars [vehicles] were crossing it, including a tank that had not yet passed, and two others who fell along with the bridge, killing its occupants." He added, "that this action resulted in the capture of four North-American mercenaries who remained imprisoned in the former living room of the Director of the Elementary School of the Experimental Farm of Funda."
 
If the Bengo bridge was destroyed, how did the FNLA troops intended to cross over the river? By swimming?

 Or did the bridge over the river Bengo continued to function, having sustained only minor, insignificant damages? My own military experience tells me that exploding and destroying a solid concrete bridge is not an easy task ... 
 

Pedro Marangoni:
 
- I found the recollections of General Xavier honest, I think he really was in Quifangondo. But none of the two bridges were destroyed and I don?t understand why the Angolans insist on lying about a fact that would have given more valor to their fight... Of course a destroyed bridge renders a position more secure, but it practically admits that they could not stop the enemy. A destroyed bridge is an extra protection.
 
Perhaps the Bengo bridge was SABOTAGED, not DESTROYED, i.e., they simply placed the explosive charges but didn?t exploded that ordinance, that would be done only if they could not stop us! Did it happened also on the Panguila bridge, where we found the fuses? Or the explosion had just failed?
 
A group of commandos under captain Valdemar preceded the great attack, infiltrating in the morning and taking the first bridge, the Panguila bridge. Only detonators were found, without explosives. I walked past it [the bridge], intact. By the time of the first attack the second bridge was also seen still in one piece by the armored units and reconnaissance planes.
 
If the Bengo bridge was destroyed, how did the Fapla/Cuban advanced against the Morro da Cal and Caxito? [They could do it] only by using bridges ... FNLA's concern was that the two bridges were blown up when we were advancing and the Zairian engineering only had one available bridge to build.
 
Still on bridges: the only major bridge that was destroyed by the MPLA, when the great FNLA push toward Luanda was taking place, was the bridge of Portoquipiri, leaving Caxito. On that spot the Zairian engineers built a floating wooden bridge and then a large metal bridge, which remains until today.
 
As for the testimony of Captain Alvaro Antonio ... always remember: the first victim of war is the truth ... Nowadays there are more heroes than fighters from a battle ... was he there? Remember that the Cubans had to force the Angolans to return to their battle stations at gun point, as they had fled in panic. There weren?t any "four U.S. mercenaries captured in combat", the only ones to be captured were the Panhard-90 crew  Remedios, the driver of the Panhard-60 Serra and his artillerist Oliveira, all Portuguese. There was an American observer from the CIA who was always unarmed and never left the Morro da Cal. The real mercenaries appeared in northern Angola one months after Quifangondo, they were in fact British and Americans, but didn?t got their way since the fight had already ended.
 
My good friend Remedios was captured because he was seriously injured (is alive and now lives in [place omitted]), but we suspect that Serra and Oliveira precipitated their Panhard-60 into the marches in order to surrender, thus deserting. Maybe you've met Oliveira, I was surprised to see him on television, years later as a FAPLA commander in southern Angola!
 
An interesting fact is that not even the MPLA really considered us as being mercenaries, they only used that as a propaganda tool, because my captured colleagues weren?t tried along with the British and Americans and had a more humane treatment. Besides Remedios, Serra and Oliveira, captured in Quifangondo, previously there had been captured, at the Battle of Caxito on September 7, 1975 the special commandos Quintino, Fernandes and Pereira (all Caucasian). They're in the image of your file:  /upload/1264179068_super_image.jpg).

 In summary, on the battleground of Quifangondo we left a Panhard-90, a Panhard-60 and a Zairian Mercedes truck; captured Caucasians - 3, all Portuguese. That captain is a liar. 
   
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
What was the fate of most of the Portuguese commandos after the disaster of Quifangondo? Portugal? South Africa? 
 
  
 
Pedro Marangoni:
 
- As I already said, Colonel Santos e Castro returned to Europe. Others went away after he abandoned the fight in February 1976, some continued to fight. For example my colleague whom we called "Passarao" [Big bird] (standing, far right in photo /upload/1265473138_super_image.jpg). I am aware that he returned from Zaire and continued fighting alone (he was born in Africa so he was a white African who was deprived of his country), making ambushes against the Cubans, he  trained and commanded a small group, acting in the region of Ambriz, until in October 1977 he suffered severe burns because his mosquito screen caught fire. He agonized for two weeks until death came. He was buried by the Africans in the woods near the Fazenda Loge, in the region of Ambriz.
 
After Angola the Portuguese commandos left to Rhodesia, some to Brazil, seeking a new homeland and others to Portugal, a country where they had never been: they were white Africans, descendants of several generations of white Africans and were badly segregated by the Portuguese in Europe.
 
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
- It is general knowledge that during the attack on Quifangondo, the FNLA and Zairian troops were supported by long-range South-African artillery. What could you say about this? 
   


 
Pedro Marangoni:
 
- The South African 140mm G-2 came to Cal Hill on the afternoon of 9 and began the barrage on the 10th around 05:00 H, diminishing the intensity of the fire until it came to an end, I cannot precise the exact time. According to colonel Santos e Castro, who informed me personally, at 16:30 (04:30 PM) the South Africans withdrew without permission or telling anyone. The South Africans fled during the fight. After Caxito they abandoned their howitzers (of which they had taken off the breeches) and were rescued in Ambriz at night by an helicopter. They fled by helicopter unto a boat lying off the coast of Ambriz, taking the breeches of 140mm G-2 howitzers with them. In all this the FNLA wasn?t taken into consideration. The howitzers were later towed by the FNLA, but without being able to use them they were left in Ambrizete as scrap.
 
   
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
- Could you detail the deployment and the composition of the FNLA and Zairian forces? How many Panhard cars, soldiers (FNLA and Zairian) and artillery pieces were available on November 10th before the last attack on Quifangondo?
 
  
 
Pedro Marangoni:
 
  - Rugh numbers:
 
Artillery: 1x 130mm cannon, 3x South African 140mm howitzers, some FNLA's 120mm mortars.
 
Cavalry: Special Commandos: 1x Panhard-90 (destroyed), 2x Panhards-60 (one destroyed and one damaged), 1x Panhard VTT with a battle group returned unharmed without putting the troops afield, a jeep with a with 106mm recoilless gun (didn?t participated). 
 
Zaire: about 10 jeeps with 106mm recoilless guns (didn?t participated), some 15 Panhards of several types that took no part of the fight, as fast as they crossed the Panguila bridge they unloaded all the ammunition and retreated. Several 20mm AA guns mounted on jeeps (didn?t participated).
 
Infantry: Commandos - of the 154-men strong, some 80 participated in the fighting but only 10 crossed the Panguila bridge, the rest didn?t advanced, remaining on the other side of the bridge.
 
FNLA: approximately 800 men (not sure, approximate number), none crossed the Panguila bridge.
 
Zaire: an infantry battalion (some say two, I don?t know), an engineering team; two Mercedes trucks, loaded with Zairian soldiers, crossed the Panguila bridge but at the first turn after the bridge they fell under fire with no chance of defense. Few returned, almost all wounded. One of the trucks returned the night after the fight with some men.
 
When I withdrew to the Morro da Cal, under heavy shelling at about 18:00 (06:00 PM) on the 10th, the whole landscape was totally deserted and the only vehicles there were the HQs jeep and our Panhard VTT.
 
On the night of November 11th, 1975, after the defeat, along with Colonel Santos e Castro, only 26 men stood at the front in the Morro da Cal, all special commandos, Portuguese, among them all the officers. The rank and file of the FNLA were nowhere to be seen. The FNLA simply ran wild without command and the Zairians retreated towards Caxito.
  
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
- The majority of sources (books, memorabilia) mention the three South African Air Force Buccaneer planes that bombarded the FAPLA/Cuban positions on the morning of November 10th.
 
On the other hand, General Xavier (Jornal de Angola, 13 January 2010. General Xavier: History lived in Kifangondo) reads: "the FAPLA were waiting for one major assault on 10th November 1975. The clock indicated 05H00 when two planes harassed the FAPLA positions at the Morro de Kifangondo. The first impression was that we were been bombarded by aviation, but no. These were reconnaissance flights that were checking the accesses, particularly the state of the bridges ... "And adds, "they were reconnaissance planes, probably coming from the runway at Ambriz or the small lanes in farms such as the farm Martins de Almeida.
 
How could you comment the words of this veteran? Were those South African bombers or FNLA?s reconnaissance planes? Was there really any South Africans planes involved in this battle?

 
Pedro Marangoni:
 
- Planes? This is very interesting. I confirm the words of General Xavier, those were our only two planes, conventional, civilian planes, for observation duties, who took off from Ambriz, but it was daylight. The first shots of the South African?s 140mm were [against?] Luanda but then they started to decrease their range in order to shell  Quifangondo. That coincided with the passage of the planes, which for laymen could be taken by an aerial bombardment.
 
Mystery: actually at about 05:00 I heard a noise sounding like fighter jets at high altitude and after that three explosions, no more that, between the hill of Quifangondo and Luanda. Were those planes or was it a shooting experience using the  guns of a South African frigate off the coast, with enough range to shell the place? This is only my conjecture as I have no information [regarding this case]. Neither Colonel Santos e Castro or Major Alves Cardoso were reported about help by planes or South African navy. If there was an attempt it didn?t went beyond that, perhaps due to difficulty of execution (proximity of opposing forces on the ground).
 
 
 
Serguei Kolomnin:
 
- In his book "А Option For the Sword" there is a very detailed and clear map
/upload/1264786543_super_image.jpg  of the positions occupied by FNLA/Zaire and FAPLA/Cubans in Quifangondo. Even with the exact number of pieces and mortars (1x 130mm Zairian gun, 3 South African 140mm howitzers, FNLA etc.), you indicated the four FAPLA/Cuban BM-21?s positions by accident or had you accurate information about those positions? Many sources say there were six [BM-21].
 
My opinion, based on memories, there were four BM-21 that arrived at Quifangondo on the eve of the 10th of November. How could you comment on this?
 
What can you say about the map of the battle made under point of view of the Angolans, which is displayed on our site / 
/upload/1265475698_super_image.jpg ?
 
  
 
Pedro Marangoni:
 
 
- The map of Quifangondo displayed there  /upload/1265475698_super_image.jpg  is a valuable document. And apparently the positions of Fapla/Cubans are close to what I have imagined. There is, in the index, the symbol for a destroyed bridge in order to prevent the enemy advance! Again, the insistence of the bridges destroyed and it is noted that oddly one cannot find such a symbol on the map, only in the index. The endorsement of mercenaries refers to our group, because Callan?s mercenaries would only arrive at a later stage. Our positions, axis of attack and subsequent retreat are correct, just there are no dates. Note that they accurately put our group at the front and FNLA in our rear. With the exception of the bridge destroyed and symbol of the alleged bombing of aviation, I think this is an honest map. 
 

My map /upload/1264786543_super_image.jpg  was done by memory without a scale  and without consulting an actual map of the terrain; it?s just what I saw during the fight. The positions of the FNLA/Zairian/Commandos is accurate; the enemy?s positions are just my guessing. The number and location of AT guns is based on information given by lieutenant Paes in the first assault.
 
The number of BM-21 was calculated by the rate of fire, when the shelling gained intensity, by the concentration of the explosions, it was only a hypothesis that now seems right.
 
NOTE: In my book, "Stalin's Organs", along with "monocaxito", was the generic terminology that we gave to any 122mm missile, with either single or multiple tubes. It didn?t referred specifically to the BM-21:/main/nauka/Qifangondo#_edn64
 
If you have reliable data, I give you my consent to update with more precision the Fapla-Cuban half on the map.
 
  
 
Serguei Kolomnin: 
 
- Could make some comments about the photos displayed on our site, dedicated to this theme /main/nauka/fotokifangondo
 
Photos №№ 9 and 11 with Panhards destroyed are originals. Maybe you know who is with Holden Roberto in photo № 3? Photo № 4 - are those soldiers of the FNLA or are they Zairian?
 
  
 
Pedro Marangoni:

-  Photo №3. /upload/1264175592_super_image.jpg The one in the foreground I cannot identify; behind him, side by side with Holden, is the Brazilian journalist and Presidential attaché, Fernando Luis da Camara Cascudo.
 
  Photo №4. /upload/1264175329_super_image.jpg  This picture seems to be from the days when FNLA was stronger, before the civil war  and even before the 25th of April. It was taken in Zaire, probably at the Quinkuzo base. Never again we saw an amount of troops such as this.
 
Photos №№ 9 e 11  /upload/1264178472_super_image.jpg   /upload/1264254311_super_image.jpg
 
I cannot identify, but throughout the entire civil war the commandos only lost a Panhard-90, Lt Paes, at Quifangondo.
 
Photo №12 /upload/1264179068_super_image.jpg  As I said before, those are the first special commandos captured at Caxito on the 7th September 1975. They engaged the enemy using obsolete equipment, being overwhelmed due to enormous numerical inferiority; they fought well. From left to right, (Caucasians) Quintino, platoon G-3; Fernandes, paratrooper, platoon MAG; Pereira, driver, Mercedez truck.
 
I discovered more photos related to Quifangondo, photos never released before, in a sorrow condition, but nevertheless important so I give permission to be published on the site. They were given me by the author, Azevedo, crewman, who escaped from the Panhard-60 whose two crewmen were captured at Quifangondo.
 
They show the South African artillery unlimbering at the Morro da Cal. On the background there is a wooden tower, a geodesic mark that also served the enemy to mark our position and that none ever took care to tore it down/upload/1265225452_super_image.jpg  there is also our three Panhards, parked near the shelter where we spent the night before the battle.  /upload/1265477608_super_image.jpg
 
Another photo shows Lt Paes Panhard-90, ready to cross the Panguila, the pennon sporting the motto "Ouso" [I Dare! ]/upload/1265225116_super_image.jpg The coloured photos were taken after the conquest of Quicabo and show, on the jeep, the commando Remedios, later captured in Quifangondo with his M-79 that General Xavier says to be on display in a museum in Luanda /u/upload/1265217091_super_image.jpg .
 
The other one is from the "Forca Aerea da FNLA" [FNLA Air Force], right after  my bombardement mission, along with Rabelo, a civilian pilot, against the Radio Station in Luanda . The men whose face are covered by black squares are explosives experts, a very good team that prepared the explosives  I droped in my flights./upload/1265478619_super_image.jpg

As a epilogue, I wish to say this: publishing these photos and my statements in Veteranangola.ru will contribute not only to the remaking of the true Angolan military History, as well as to point out, to reveal the social injustices and discriminations, commited by European and Africans alike, that should be known to all, at leat as a way of compensation and paying tribute to the victims.
 
On behalf of the Militay History, this will be an exquisite map, drawed by the two opposing sides in the conflict. I believe this is an opportunity to show the entire World that soldiers fighting each other are professionals at work, not personal enemies.

 END
 

 

 




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