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[15.01.2010 19:14:22] pedro marangoni
(Translated by Google Tranlator, may contain errors)

Победа при Кифангондо: триумф советского оружия в Африке
The victory at Kifangondo: the triumph of Soviet arms in Africa.(Sergei Kolomnin)

Mr Sergei Kolomnin: here are my comments about your important text ; excuse the inaccuracies that may arise from the translation.

Would four MLRS BM-21 Grad stopped the enemies advancing on Luanda and changed the course of the war?

Yes...But not as a weapon of destruction, but of moral effect
Observing the behavior of Africans in combat, in a non-scientific but based on recent wars, we find that its toughness decreases from north to south of the continent. My experience in southern Africa showed that those who attacked won, who was attacked retreated and most casualties were civilians, not combatants .Elastics fronts and no deep motivation .Was the proportion of non-African-advisers, internationalist, mercenaries , volunteers, that decided the confronts.These,troopers of conquest, the other, simple occupation of land conquered. And so it happened also in Angola, significantly.
The non-africans combatants,with ideals, or will to win were affected by weapons that were really dangerous and produced victims,but the overwhelming majority of African feared anything that exploded and made noise.Sorry for not being politically correct, but that's the truth .
I was in the seventies, warned that it would provide important information to the enemy, to depreciate in articles written, the Soviet Union 122mm, who considered a stun gun, not effective to cause deads. We feared a mortar 81; a mortar 120,preached us in the ground, inevitably ...
I watched countless times, the mark left on the pavement or the ground, by 122 explosions and mortar 120,81,60 to. The mortar shrapnel tore the ground at the point of impact, drawing a star, showing that swept the ground in low trajectory, reaching even those who were lying on the ground Since the 122 left little marks, with shrapnel and thrown angled closer, louder and less dangerous. Several fell a few feet from me in the battle of Quifangondo without further damage. I'm sure that a mortar falling into the same short distance would have put me out of combat.
But the ability to launch multiple, rapid sequence of the MLRS BM-21 is devastating to troops poorly trained, inexperienced or poorly motivated. Without any doubt they were crucial to the panic and stampede of troops FNLA and Zairian in Quifangondo.
But what stopped the small non-African troops? First, the cannon 76mm anti-tank, who took advantage due the absurd advance of the fragile Panhard fully discovered, and secondly, to stop the few infantry men who follow behind them, the anti-aircraft machine guns (ZPU-4?) whose shot could feel over our heads and not letting us get off the ground. Terrible!
But even if the Panhards were not stopped and our small group could move forward, we would not have anyone following us, because the bulk of African troops had fled terrified by the devastating psychological effect of MLRS BM-21 Grad ...
I agree that this weapon was decisive not only in the course of battle, but the entire war. I believe that if the undisciplined Zairian army entered in Luanda, everything would be destroyed and looted and an avalanche of troops of Mobutu Sesse Seko would transpos the northern border, in a criminal occupation .And us, the small group of special commands, which in an ideal served as the spearhead, we would be wiped out or imprisoned or expelled,because we acted as a barrier to barbarity Zaïre to Angola.
pedro marangoni
Original em português

Quatro MLRS BM-21 Grad deteram os inimigos que avançavam sobre Luanda e mudaram o rumo da guerra?
Sim ,mas como arma de efeito moral e não destrutivo.
Observando o comportamento dos africanos em combate,de um modo não científico mas baseados em guerras recentes,verificaremos que a sua combatividade decresce do norte para o sul do continente negro. Minha experiencia na Africa Austral mostrava que quem atacava vencia,quem era atacado recuava sempre e a maior parte das vítimas eram civis,não militares.Frentes elásticas e combatentes sem qualquer motivação mais profunda.Era a proporção de não-africanos -advisers,internacionalistas,mercenários,voluntários,etc-que decidia os confrontos.Estes eram tropas de conquista,os outros,de simples ocupação de terreno conquistado. E assim aconteceu também em Angola,de forma significativa.
Os combatentes não-africanos com ideais ou vontade de vencer eram afetados por armas que realmente eram perigosas e produziam baixas;a esmagadora maioria africana temia qualquer coisa que explodia e fizesse barulho.Desculpem-me por não ser politicamente correto,mas esta é a verdade.
Fui,nos anos setenta,advertido de que estaria fornecendo informações importantes ao inimigo,ao menosprezar em artigos escritos,o 122 soviético,que considerava uma arma de efeito moral,não efetivo para causar baixas.Mas assim o via,como os demais colegas de combate. Temíamos mais um morteiro 81. Um morteiro 120,então,nos pregava ao solo,irremediavelmente...
Observei incontáveis vezes,a marca deixada no asfalto ou no solo,por explosões do 122 e dos morteiros 120,81,60. Os estilhaços dos morteiros rasgavam o solo no ponto de impacto,desenhando uma estrela,mostrando que varreram o solo em trajetória rasante,atingindo mesmo quem estivesse deitado. Já o 122 deixava poucas marcas,com estilhaços sendo lançados em angulo mais fechado,mais alto e menos perigosos. Vários cairam a poucos metros de mim na batalha de Quifangondo,sem maiores danos.Tenho certeza que qualquer morteiro caindo na mesma curta distancia teria me posto fora de combate.
Mas a capacidade de lançamento múltiplo,rápido,sequencial dos MLRS BM-21 é devastador para tropas mal treinadas,inexperientes ou pouco motivadas. Sem nenhuma dúvida eles foram decisivos para o pânico e a debandada geral das tropas da FNLA e zairenses em Quifangondo.
E o que deteve a pequena tropa não africana? Em primeiro lugar,os canhões anti-carro 76mm,que aproveitaram o absurdo avanço das frágeis Panhard totalmente descobertas;em segundo lugar,para segurar os poucos infantes que seguiriam atrás delas,as metralhadoras anti-aéreas(ZPU-4?) cujo tiro podíamos sentir sobre nossas cabeças e que não nos deixavam levantar do solo.
Mas,mesmo se as Panhards não fossem detidas e nosso pequeno grupo pudesse avançar,não teríamos ninguém nos seguindo,pois o grosso da tropa africana debandara apavorada pelo efeito psicologicamente devastador dos MLRS BM-21 Grad...
Resumindo,sim,concordo que esta arma foi decisiva não só no rumo da batalha,mas de toda a guerra. Acredito que se o indisciplinado exercito zairense entrasse em Luanda,tudo seria arrasado e saqueado e uma avalanche de tropas de Mobutu Sesse Seko se despejariam pela fronteira norte,numa ocupação criminosa.E nós,o pequeno grupo de comandos especiais que por um ideal,serviu de ponta de lança, seriamos dizimados ou presos ou expulsos,pois representavamos um obstáculo às barbáries zairenses em solo angolano.
pedro marangoni

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[14.01.2010 17:06:45] Daniel
Iam busy writing a book on the history of the seaborne specops attacks in the Angola harbors ex Namibe sinking of boats, blowing up oilstorage etc,etc.I read about a \"Russian movie about the war in Angola\" by Andrey Kuzminov and Sergey Karamyev, they also talk there about the attacks in the different harbors.
Can anybody help me on more info on all these operations

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[14.01.2010 05:03:13] Johan Schoeman
On the issue of mercenaries....the following interesting discussion came up on one of the Forums of www.warinangola.com and here is the question, then:
Were there ANY mercenaries involved in the Angolan conflict AFTER 1975/76?
I say, I would think so! The Frenchman (ex Foreign Legion) who joined the Recces and that I met in 1981 while on Operation Daisy MUST surely have been a mercenary! And what about mercenaries on the Fapla side? It was not just the so called \"Free World\" that produced mercenaries!
This may be something members of the Russian veterans could comment on...

The topic and discussion can be viewed at **Ссылка »***

Regards
Johan
www.warinangola.com

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[11.01.2010 16:22:04] pedro marangoni
Dear Serguei Kolomnin
Thank you for your words. Gradually, the history is being written and mostly corrected, free of political influence and away from the heat of events. Few people present as combatants write about the war, leaving that for writers who are biased, are committed somewhere. An American politician said in the past: \"The first casuality of war is truth\" ... Is our duty to correct false information, full of political interest. I found honest the testimony of General Xavier, Angolan military, it seems to me that really was in combat in Quifangondo:
**Ссылка »*** ( in Portuguese )
I also read the information from a veteran Cuban site:
**Ссылка »*** (in English and Spanish.)
I suggest you use the Google Translator, which translates with a lot of mistakes but we can understand well, Russian, English, Portuguese, etc..
Cheers, keep contact!
pedro marangoni

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[07.01.2010 20:06:02] Serguei Kolomnin
Уважаемые ветераны Анголы, владеющие английским и регулярно посещающие эту страницу! Если найдете время и возможность перевести на английский мой ответ Педро Марангони (Бразилия), был бы Вам очень признателен. Спасибо!


Уважаемый Педро Марангони!
Рад приветствовать коллегу по историческим исследованиям, тем более, что вы были участником событий под Кифангондо в октябре-ноябре 1975 г., воевали в составе формирований УНИТА и Заира в боях на Севере Анголы осенью 1975 г. Вы – очевидец и участник тех событий, это очень ценно. В декабре 2009 г. в очень авторитетном российском Военно-историческом журнале №12 за 2009 г. опубликована моя статья Sergey Kolomnin. Victory under Kifangondo: the triumph of the Soviet weapon. Ее текст, причем полный в отличие от журнальной публикации, выставлен на нашем сайте **Ссылка »***

Там есть ссылки на Вашу книгу «A opção pela espada». Вашу книгу я внимательно изучил, еще когда она только появилась в Сети и считаю, что там много уникальных фактов и свидетельств, которые проливают свет на те события.

Вы правы, в том, что объективное описание тех событий возможно только, когда присутствуют свидетельства с обеих сторон. Это, кстати, одна из задач нашего Союза и Сайта **Ссылка »*** . В этом я Вас полностью поддерживаю.

Я был в Анголу гораздо позже Вас, только в феврале 1977 г., спустя два года после окончания боев на Севере Анголы между МПЛА (ФАПЛА) и ФНЛА. Однако бывал в тех местах много раз, встречался с ангольскими (МПЛА) и кубинскими участниками боев под Кифангондо, и увлекся этой темой. Написал и опубликовал несколько статей в журнале «Солдат Удачи» (русское издание) и др. газетах и журналах России. В России вышла также моя книга «Русский спецназ в Африке». (Коломнин С. Русский спецназ в Африке. Эксмо, Яуза, М., 2002.).
В Анголе я находился с февраля 1977 по июнь 1979 г, затем работал, помогая друзьям из ФАПЛА с 1980 по 1983 г. Знаю многих ангольских и кубинских командиров, в том числе и участвовавших в боях под Кифангондо, например, генералов «Нгонго» и «Ндалу», которые участвовали в боях под Куфангондо.

Я согласен с Вашим высказыванием, что «члены группы полковника Сантуша и Каштру были не наемниками, а бойцами, жившими в Африке и намеревавшимися оставаться там всю жизнь. Всего 153 португальца и я – урожденный бразилец. А вот через месяц после Кифангонду стали прибывать настоящие наемники – британцы и американцы, но они уже ничего не смоли сделать, поскольку на Севере война была приграна (ФНЛА)» (The group of Colonel Santos e Castro was not mercenary, but fighters who lived in Africa and there wanted to stay there for life. Only 153 Portuguese and I, brazilian born. After Kifangondo,one month later, the true mercenaries, British and American was arrived in north Angola, and have done almost nothing because the struggle was finished).
Вы можете найти на сайте ссылку к материалу **Ссылка »*** Sergey Kolomnin. Victory under Kifangondo: the triumph of the Soviet weapon, №22 на сайте veteranangola.ru. Привожу ее: «Автор считает, называть их всех наемниками было бы неправильно. Их услуги не оплачивались ни ФНЛА, ни ЦРУ США. Эти белые ангольцы, часто всех белых в Анголе ошибочно называют португальцами, находились на своей родине и рассчитывали в случае победы Х. Роберто занять соответствующее положение в новой армии и государстве под руководством ФНЛА»
То же самое я писал в Книге «Русский спецназ в Африке», вышедшей в России достаточно широким тиражом.
Уважаемый Педро Марангони, мы рады приветствовать Вас на нашем сайте. Есть что обсудить, что вспомнить.
К сожалению, ресурс **Ссылка »*** недоступен для перевода на английский или португальский на сайте. Но если Вы сможете его скопировать и перевести на португальский или английский, используя другие средства и дать свои замечания о материале Victory under Kifangondo: the triumph of the Soviet weapon, мне и надеюсь другим ветеранам Анголы было бы очень интересно и полезно узнать Ваше мнение и замечания.

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[06.01.2010 15:45:53] Johan Schoeman
Compliments of the season to you all!

I would just like to point erstwhile mercenaries (like pedro marangoni) to a dedicated site for mercenaries involved in wars between 1945 and 2000. It was brought under my attention recently and I am collaborating with them in both the provision and gathering of information relating to mercenaries in Angola during 1975/76.

The site is at **Ссылка »***

I am sure your members will find some of this information fascinating and can maybe even contribute information and/or stories about encounters with mercenaries in Angola.

Regards

Johan Schoeman
www.warinangola.com

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[31.12.2009 16:25:01] Max Gladkov
To all our Visitors and Friends,

HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR!

FELIZ E PROSPERO ANO NOVO!

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[28.12.2009 18:13:31] p.a.marangoni
Dear mate
Yes,you can post my book in \"Outlook from the other side\" The editions in \"paper\"no longer exist, and I put in Internet for free download,mainly for our veterans from both sides. The true only is complete if both sides can be listen. I was born warrior,but is very exciting now,in my 60 years old,in peace,be contact with a former enemy. I think that we all warriors in the old and good times are now,in this new world, brothers. We lived a true life.
The new adress in Net is:
**Ссылка »***
Cheers,
pedro marangoni
(Brazil)

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[28.12.2009 15:30:05] Max Gladkov
Hi Pedro,

Thank you for your feedback. I have translated it into Russian and posted on our Russian page. By the way, I tried to find your book on Mocambique para Todos website, where I had found it previously, in order to refer to it those of our visitors who can read in Portuguese, but failed. The book has been deleted from the server. Luckily, I have an electronic copy of it in the PDF format that I downloaded from the above site some time ago. What do you think about posting it on our “Outlook from the other side” page? This will make it available to many truly interested people who will never be able to read it otherwise.

Regards,

MG

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[27.12.2009 22:13:02] p.a.marangoni
Good site,congratulations. But I remember that the group of Colonel Santos e Castro was not mercenary, but fighters who lived in Africa and there wanted to stay there for life.Only 153 Portuguese and I,brazilian born. After Kifangondo,one month later, the true mercenaries, British and American was arrived in north Angola, and have done almost nothing because the struggle was finished. I have some photos and a map of the Battle of Quifangondo in:
**Ссылка »***
Cheers!
p.a.marangoni

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[21.12.2009 13:59:00] Johan Schoeman
Thank you all for your incredible feedback. Seasons greetings from all of us (myself and all the registered users of www.warinangola.com) to all the Russian Veterans of Angola and their families, as well as other guests and visitors to the English Guestbook.

I hope I may have the privilidge of meeting some of you one day soon!

May you all have a very Merry Christmas and a Happy and prosperous 2010...!

Regards
Johan Schoeman
www.warinangola.com

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[20.12.2009 15:53:19] RAVU
Russian Angola Veterans’ Union extends Season’s Greetings to all the visitors of our English Guestbook.

Let the war be in the past! We shall remember it as part of our history, but let’s live today! Because only the dinosaurs live in the past – thank you, Andrew, for this great metaphor!

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!

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[20.12.2009 15:43:47] Max Gladkov
Hi Nobody,

Good to see you at our site. Your blog is no less interesting. By the way, we found there a lot of pictures from our site – we do not mind other people borrowing them from us provided that there is a proper reference to us as a source – the website of the Russian Angola Veterans’ Union: www.veteranangola.ru

If my understanding is correct, you are based in Florida, USA. I normally stay in St. Augustine in summer and go SCUBA diving all around the state. We could meet and talk someday.

Regards,

MG

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[17.12.2009 06:08:58] Nobody
Very interesting site. In my blog **Ссылка »*** have an argument about the presence of FAPLA east of the Lomba River in November 1987. I would appreciate the visit and any information. Thank you. And Merry Christmas.

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[15.12.2009 23:33:00] Andrew
A response to Koos van Dyke.
Yip, it was Mr van Staden.
Cripes, it was a bit unnerving seeing my whole epistle to Maxim here, maar nou ja, maybe I should have been more formal- but then one looses colour etc I guess.
I must mention that I remain intrigued by this \"Os Teriveis\" thing - I\'ve seen it in literature, but if I ever came across it during my service I never took note, I\'d love to know the background. Re the language situation,If I am not mistaken, Portuguese was the Unit lingua franca, RSA members transferring in were \"assisted\" in acquiring the basics - sort of yes, no and advance, and sing a couple of marching songs. As far as Queen Lillybet\'s English and the Taal of Totius is concerned, it was the usual SADF scenario. Remember we the junior leadergroup were all expected to be billingual ( one might argue that that means be able to speak Afrikaans only ). I spoke Portuguese and Afrikaans almost exclusively to the extent that my English was no doubt traumatised. In terms of comunicating, you just got the message across as best you could - it was not a question of abiding by \"Die Amptelike Taalbeleid van die SAW\", keeping statistics for weekly analysis or whatever.Amongst the RSA members with at least one notable exception, it sort of became cool to be able to say as much as possible in Portuguese, sort of identified you as a \"heavy\" from Buffalo, know what I mean, nudge, nudge etc . Even today around the braaifires the lingua gets bandied about, talking of which, my meat is burning..........

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[14.12.2009 16:47:58] Max Gladkov
Johan, thank you very much for your response. I promised to all the parties to be unbiased. I will translate your answer and post it on the Russian page.

Kind regards,

MG

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[14.12.2009 14:56:55] Johan Schoeman
Max, that is so terrible to hear tragic stories like that! I am sure the pilot would not wish to hear that, even though, of course, he could not possibly have seen the boy and therefore specifically aimed at him.... Collateral damage is that horrible side of war and unfortunately applies to both sides. Even an an artilleryman I dread finding out about some poor innocent that was killed or miamed in our artillery bombardments of a town like Cuito Cuanavale. And none compare to the cost in innocent lives that mines left as a legacy of war, especially in Angola and northern Namibia.

I will post the message on www.warinangola.com too to see the reaction....

Regards
Johan

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[12.12.2009 23:09:54] Max Gladkov
This is a message I got from Orest Korgut, a former advisor to FAPLA 19 Infantry Brigade, during our recent discussion on the Russian Guestbook.

"About SAAF pilots

April 22, 1982 or 1983 (I do not remember exactly), having enjoyed our lean dinner consisting of rice with sardines and tea (with no bread) we, advisors of FAPLA 19 Infantry Brigade were engaged in a kind of small talk while smoking under a baobab near our tent. The sun had set; it was around 19:00. In Mulondo there is a T-junction. Some 50-70 meters from the junction, near the dirt road to Quiteve, a fire was dying out. Near the fire a boy of about 10 was sitting with a yeanling standing by his side. Suddenly we heard the sound of a buzzing fighter jet poppling free rockets. Maxim, please, tell this pilot that he killed both the boy and the yeanling…"

MG

MG

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[08.12.2009 02:18:52] Johan Schoeman
Max, great idea! And I havve seen the stories published already! I really hope more of the guys will post their stories for your benefit as well. I will certainly encourage the users and visitors of www.warinangola.com to do this...

Koos, as to the 32Bn and Afrikaans/Portuguese issue, I think Andrew will be able to answer yuu correctly. As far as I know they used Afrikaans for their battle orders and the NCO's could all undertstand that.

Oh, and I seem to remember Richard Harris... I am sure he was one of the \"Souties\" that did GPO (Gun Post Officer) course with me in 1980! If it is him, send him my regards and point him to my WarInAngola site, please...;-)

And Koos.... about the DVD you mentioned... I would appreciate it if you could send it to me so I can maybe load it as an incentive to get my users to register so that only registered users can view selected portians of it. I am also going to be doing the same with some footage of the last tour to Angola with Col Breytenbach...

Regards

Johan

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[07.12.2009 19:59:45] Koos van Dyke
Dear Andrew

I translated your story into Russian and I believe Max will put it on the site some time soon. First of all – let me thank you for that story. I have an interesting question, though. You write \"my immediate commander at that stage was the platoon commander that had captured your warrant officer some years before in the Ongiva area\". As I checked out the officer’s name in 1981 (in time of Op Protea when WO Nikolai Pestretsov been captured) was Lt Tinus van Staden – at least according to this source **Ссылка »***
Am I correct to assume it was the same person?
And I would appreciate if you could answer another question. Far as I know 32nd Battalion (Os Terrivis) was (well at least that was in early 80s) the only Portuguese-speaking unit in SADF – I even read that it was the official language of the unit. Of course, all the officers in Buffalo Bn were whites and till the early 80s at least half of them were Englishmen (and I believe Afrikaans-speaking) – but NCOs and privates were blacks, and predominantly Portuguese-speaking. So how do you manage twixt Afrikaans and Portuguese?

Thanks a lot
Regards,
Koos

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[07.12.2009 11:18:16] andrew hamilton
maxim, i think that maybe you ought to consider removing your exclusion of \'racist\' comments. Racism is quite obsolete. \"Extremism\" or \'Hate- Speach\' as alternatives maybe ?

Maybe the racists should be allowed to make fool;s of themselves ?

My best wishes

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[07.12.2009 11:15:58] andrew hamilton
maxim, i think that maybe you ought to consider removing your exclusion of 'racist' comments. Racism is quite obsolete. "Extremism" or 'Hate- Speach' as alternatives maybe ?

My best wishes

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[07.12.2009 10:53:00] Andrew Hamilton
Hello Maxim, it was great fun exchanging \'flash\'messages with you yesterday - some of your questions answered - I went in to what we called Operation Modular a 2nd Lt as the most junior, least competent, 32 Bn Platoon Commander. I took the second conventional convoy in, at a time when we still were not sure if we would commit any forces more than 32 Bn. My company and platoon were the weakest in the Bn at the time due to normal attrition - we had been in the war from \'75.i was responsible for the safety of the log route from the Lemuna river to Mavinga, as well as keeping an eye on the airfield at Mavinga.My platoon was also on stadby for search and rescue support to the Air Force. In November \'87 we moved up and spent some time on the tanks, and as i have discussed with Andrei Polikanov, i even spent some time trying to ambush the helicopters that were being sent to evacuate the foreign advisors, before all going on holiday for Christmas.I had learned a lot........ We returned in early \'88, we were due to be on those tanks that we gave away that day - but a query from our commander to Chief Army sorted that one out. My company Sargeant Major ( by this time I a full Lt and acting company commander ) was part of the team that marked out the approach routes to the Tumpo start line. We monitored the radio communications with great frustration due to the failure of our mine-clearing equipment. The next day we went to the high-ground overlooking Cuito to re-inforce the artillary obervers- it was very embarrassing. We had UNITA guides and we were two platoons. My colleague a Namibian maniac decided that he was going to put UNITa\'s stamina to the test, in spite of the fact that we were carrying full kit and they were so-called Special Forces, without kit. Anyway the Unita guides conceded defeat and refused to maintain the pace for the last bit - but we were pretty tired also. So my RPG gunner, on reaching his position allowed himself to fall back against a tree on to his backside - As he did this he inadvertantly pulled the trigger on his RPG - Whooosh - there goes the grenade towards Cuito and self-destructing , and leaving a massive cloud of smoke and debris so that your observers could mark our position !! Funnily enough, my immediate commander at that stage was the platoon commander that had captured your warrant officer some years before in the Ongiva area I believe. Shortly after that we were sent to the Techipa area to pay the Cubans some attention, or vice versa - we did a lot of tactical withdrawing and re-deploying there - we were on foot and they were driving around in all those PT76\'s, BRDM\'s, BTR\'s etc - you know the ones with bigger and faster guns.

Salut Comrade veterans

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[06.12.2009 19:01:09] Max Gladkov
Andrew-

You can start with a book by Igor Zhdarkin: **Ссылка »***

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[06.12.2009 18:01:36] Andrew Hamilton
Except for Babel, is there an easier way to access the Russian bits in English - it would be fun

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